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ONE SHORT OF A LOAD:
WHY AN ILLINOIS BRICK REPEALER WILL
INCREASE PRIVATE ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT IN MONTANA
Gale Price*

I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2002, Montana Attorney General Mike McGrath filed suit
against 18 prescription drug companies.1 The complaint, filed in Montana’s
First Judicial District Court in Helena, alleged the companies had violated
state antitrust law by inflating their products’ average wholesale price,
which was used to calculate Medicare, Medicaid, and other consumer reimbursements.2 McGrath brought the claim on behalf of “[t]he State of Montana, the federal government, low-income Medicaid recipients and the general public.”3 Five years later, through a settlement with one company
alone, the State was able to pass nearly $200,000 to community clinics.4
Montana’s successful action demonstrates how important state antitrust law and enforcement can be. State antitrust statutes are often broader
in scope than federal antitrust law, covering a broader spectrum of anticompetitive conduct.5 Additionally, many state statutes regulate specific conduct and industries, unlike the relatively general provisions of the Sherman
Act.6 States may be more willing to focus on local restraint of trade cases
and can bring expertise in local markets.7 Further, states bring a unique
focus on monetary compensation both in their proprietary capacity as an
injured entity and as parens patriae for their citizens.8 Finally, states can
* B.A. University of Montana 2006; J.D. University of Montana 2012. Ms. Price currently serves
as law clerk to the Honorable Terry L. Myers, U.S. Bankruptcy Court District of Idaho. The ideas and
analysis in this comment are hers alone.
1. Mont. Dept. of Justice, Press Release, McGrath Sues Drug Companies Over Prescription Price
Fraud, https://doj.mt.gov/2002/02/mcgrath-sues-drug-companies-over-prescription-price-fraud/ (Feb.
25, 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Mont. Dept. of Justice, Press Release, Funds from Pharmaceutical Settlement Passed Along to
Community Clinics, https://doj.mt.gov/2007/12/funds-from-pharmaceutical-settlement-passed-along-tocommunity-clinics/ (Dec. 19, 2007).
5. David W. Lamb, Avoiding Impotence: Rethinking the Standards for Applying State Antitrust
Laws to Interstate Commerce, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1705, 1717 (2001).
6. Donald L. Flexner & Mark A. Racanelli, State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the United
States: Collision or Harmony?, 9 Conn. J. Intl. L. 501, 511 (1994).
7. Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement, 69 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1004, 1034 (2001).
8. Id. at 1039.
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make up for a lack of federal enforcement when antitrust is not a priority
for the presidential administration.9 Each of these advantages provides
compelling justification for state participation in the antitrust arena through
legislation and enforcement.10
Yet despite the importance of state antitrust law in our nation’s antitrust scheme, startlingly few cases have been decided under Montana’s state
antitrust laws. This author could only locate six Montana Supreme Court
decisions, eleven Montana District Court decisions, and four U.S. District
Court for the District of Montana decisions addressing the merits of claims
under the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“MUTPA”).11 No antitrust
decisions have been filed discussing the merits of claims under the unfair
competition provisions of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”),12 Montana’s “mini-FTC” Act.
Any number of factors could explain this phenomenon, but a state statute repealing the federal indirect purchaser doctrine could provide one particular avenue for increasing the number of antitrust cases in Montana. Part
II of this comment explains the history behind and effects of the United
States Supreme Court’s adoption of the indirect purchaser doctrine in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.13 Part III examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holding in California v. ARC America Corporation14 that Illinois Brick does
not preempt state laws and explores the subsequent state law developments
regarding indirect purchasers. Part IV analyzes the need for an Illinois
Brick repealer in Montana based on Montana antitrust statutes and the sole
state district court decision discussing the issue. Because Montana’s law
regarding indirect purchaser suits is ambiguous, enacting an Illinois Brick
repealer would create clarity in the law that would reduce a plaintiff’s risk
in bringing such a suit. Additionally, such a provision would act as a policy
tool to expand the number of possible claims under the MUTPA, which
hopefully would impact the amount of meaningful antitrust enforcement in
Montana.

9. Katherine Mason Jones, Federalism and Concurrent Jurisdiction in Global Markets: Why a
Combination of National and State Antitrust Enforcement Is a Model for Effective Economic Regulation,
30 Nw. J. Intl. L. & Bus. 285, 336 (2010).
10. This is not to say state involvement in antitrust does not have its critics. See e.g Barbara O.
Bruckmann, The Case for a Commerce Clause Challenge to State Antitrust Laws Banning Minimum
Resale Price Maintenance, 39 Hastings Const. L.Q. 391 (2012); Michael S. Greve, Cartel Federalism?
Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys General, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 99 (2005); Richard A. Posner,
Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 Antitrust L.J. 925, 940–943 (2001).
11. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 30–14–201 to 30–14–226 (2011).
12. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 30–14–101 to 30–14–143.
13. Ill. Brick Co. v. Ill., 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
14. Cal. v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
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INDIRECT PURCHASER DOCTRINE

The indirect purchaser rule limits who may bring actions under § 4 of
the Clayton Act.15 Section 4 gives “any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws” a
cause of action, including mandatory treble damages, costs, and attorney’s
fees.16 Although Congress’s wording in the Clayton Act was relatively
broad, granting a cause of action to “any person who shall be injured,”17 the
indirect purchaser rule greatly curtails that breadth by preventing a purchaser from suing for compensatory damages any time a third party appears
in the supply chain between it and the alleged monopolist.18 Although the
indirect purchaser rule was adopted in Illinois Brick, its genesis was in another antitrust case decided nine years earlier: Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp.19 And in the 35 years since Illinois Brick, the indirect purchaser doctrine has been a source of heated debate in the legal and
academic communities and has been deservedly criticized.
A. Hanover and the Elimination of the “Passing-On” Defense
The roots of the indirect purchaser rule can be traced back to the Hanover case, in which the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the so-called “passingon defense.”20 In that case, Hanover Shoe, Inc. brought a complaint under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act21 and § 4 of the Clayton Act22 alleging United had
monopolized the shoe machinery industry by only leasing its shoe manufacturing machines and refusing to sell them, which resulted in increased costs
for Hanover.23 United asserted Hanover should not have prevailed on its
claims because it had passed on the overcharge to its customers and was
therefore not injured as required by the statute.24
The Court relied on three policy arguments in rejecting United’s argument and effectively eliminating the “passing-on” defense. First, the Court
noted that the amount of the overcharge that was passed on to other parties
would be inherently difficult to trace among the “wide range of factors” that
affect the pricing decisions of a business.25 Second, the traceability problem would result in incredibly complicated litigation, which would arise
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 745–747.
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
Id. at 494.
15 U.S.C. § 2.
15 U.S.C. § 15.
Hanover Shoe, Inc., 392 U.S. at 483–484.
Id. at 487–488.
Id. at 492.
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frequently because of the number of antitrust defendants who would attempt to assert the defense.26 Finally, the Court worried that, as a result of
the passing-on defense, anticompetitive behavior would go unpunished.27
If direct purchasers made the sole recovery, they would more likely assert
claims than indirect purchasers whose incentive to litigate would be small:
“These ultimate consumers, in today’s case the buyers of single pairs of
shoes, would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action.”28 Yet Hanover did not directly bar suits by indirect purchasers; instead it only barred defensive use of the “passing-on”
doctrine.29
B. Illinois Brick and the Rejection of Indirect Purchaser Suits
The U.S. Supreme Court actually adopted the indirect purchaser rule in
Illinois Brick, nine years after Hanover. In that case, the state of Illinois
sued concrete block manufacturers on behalf of itself and 700 local governments alleging the manufacturers had fixed prices,30 which resulted in the
governments paying over $3 million more for the blocks than they would
have paid in a competitive market.31 The governments were indirect purchasers because the supply chain included masonry contractors, who purchased the concrete blocks from the manufacturers for use in masonry
work, and general contractors, who incorporated the masonry into larger
buildings and sold them to the governments.32 The concrete block manufacturers argued only direct purchasers could bring such a claim, and the
federal district court granted summary judgment to them.33 But the Seventh
Circuit reversed, holding indirect purchasers could bring such claims as
long as they could show the overcharge was passed on to them by the intervening economic actors.34
The U.S. Supreme Court first rejected an asymmetric rule that would
treat plaintiff and defendant use of the passing-on doctrine differently, then
decided to apply the Hanover rule to plaintiffs rather than reject it altogether.35 In rejecting an asymmetric rule, the majority noted the reasons
why it rejected the passing-on defense in Hanover applied equally to plaintiffs, especially the traceability problems with analyzing the amount of
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 493.
Id. at 494.
Id.
Hanover Shoe, Inc., 392 U.S. at 494.
Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 726–727.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 727–728.
Id. at 728–729.
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damages each plaintiff suffered.36 The majority worried such a rule would
result in unwarranted multiple liability for defendants by allowing indirect
purchasers to recover passed-on overcharges, while also presuming the direct purchaser should receive a full recovery under Hanover.37 The majority also rejected the argument that the policies of deterrence and punishment
behind the enactment of the treble damages provision by Congress justified
an unequal application of the rule.38
After deciding an asymmetric application of the rule would be improper, the majority then turned to the question of whether to overrule Hanover. As in Hanover, the Court worried about how complicated litigation
could become.39 In particular, the Illinois Brick majority cited concerns
about compulsory joinder of necessary indirect purchasers in antitrust suits
and the practical ability to join all necessary parties in the suit when some
may not want to participate, others may not be a manageable class, and still
others may be beyond the court’s personal jurisdiction.40 The majority further remarked on the difficulty of tracing the damages related to
overcharges from one party to another even in an oversimplified economic
model, let alone under the complicated facts of an actual case.41 The opinion also reiterated the Court’s beliefs that direct purchasers are best suited
to serve as private attorneys general and allowing such purchasers to fully
recover the overcharge creates an incentive for them to bring suits.42 While
the majority explicitly recognized that the indirect purchaser rule would
mean some injured parties would not be compensated for their damages, it
stated arguments in favor of establishing the rule outweighed those concerns.43
C. Criticisms of the Indirect Purchaser Rule
Opponents immediately began criticizing the Illinois Brick ruling.44
The first critique came in Justice Brennan’s dissent, which accused the majority of thwarting Congress’s two primary objectives: compensation and
deterrence. Justice Brennan explained, “Injured consumers are precluded
from recovering damages from manufacturers, and direct purchasers who
act as middlemen have little incentive to sue suppliers so long as they may
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
Rev. 1,

Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 731–732.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 733–735.
Id. at 736–737.
Id. at 737–741.
Id. at 741–742.
Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 745–746.
Id. at 746–747.
Edward D. Cavanagh, Illinois Brick: A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 17 Loy. Consumer L.
18 (2004).
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pass on the bulk of the illegal overcharges to the ultimate consumers.”45
Indeed, the majority recognized that weakness in its opinion,46 but worried
that attempting to trace and allocate damages among all the remote purchasers would merely deplete the recovery rather than make victims whole.47
Still, the majority opinion represents a conscious decision on the Court’s
part to prohibit indirect purchasers from recovering damages even though
they may have borne the brunt of the passed-on costs. Further, allowing
direct purchasers to recover the full overcharge may give them a windfall if
they have already passed on the overcharge to their customers,48 ultimately
allowing them to collect their damages twice.49 However, the Court insisted deterrence would be better effected if direct purchasers could recover
the full amount rather than apportioning the recovery among all those who
may have been injured.50
In recent years, some opponents have criticized the validity of the
Court’s deterrence justification. Some scholars have noted that direct purchasers may not have much incentive to sue their suppliers, especially if
they can pass on the cost to their customers.51 Further, the indirect purchaser rule could actually encourage anticompetitive behavior:
Because illegal cartels and monopolists can share rents with direct purchasers
without explicitly including them in an illegal conspiracy (and threaten to
boycott those who bring suit) antitrust violators can manipulate the incentives
of the only parties who have standing. Such arrangements, dubbed “Illinois
Walls” because they put illegal conduct effectively beyond the reach of private antitrust enforcement, exploit the weakness in the indirect purchaser rule
and facilitate tacit cooperation between antitrust violators and direct purchasers that is virtually impossible to punish.52

Direct purchasers may not only have little incentive to bring such claims,
but relying on them may ultimately increase the anticompetitive behavior
by firms.
Indirect purchasers may also have more incentive to bring such claims
than the Supreme Court assumed in Hanover and Illinois Brick. The modern class action had not developed when Hanover was decided; Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had not yet been adopted.53 The mod45. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 749 (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
46. Id. at 746 (majority).
47. Id. at 747.
48. Cavanagh, supra n. 44, at 23–24.
49. Christopher Paul Dean, Davidson v. Microsoft Corporation: Reexamining Maryland’s Illinois
Brick Bar against Indirect Private Purchasers, 33 U. Balt. L. Rev. 69, 77 (2003).
50. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 745–746.
51. Cavanagh, supra n. 44, at 24.
52. Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 69, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).
53. Donald I. Baker, Federalism and Futility: Hitting the Potholes on the Illinois Brick Road, 17
Antitrust 14, 15 (Fall 2002).
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ern system increases the likelihood that indirect purchasers would be willing to participate in a class action suit and so would bring claims against
anticompetitive companies.54
Finally, application of the indirect purchaser rule in our modern product distribution system may result in significant inequities. With the advent
of the internet, many products have become available directly from the
manufacturer, while at the same time many of those manufacturers continue
to use traditional methods of distribution. Under Illinois Brick, final consumers who purchase the product direct from the manufacturer may sue for
antitrust violations, but final consumers who purchase the product through
an intermediary, like a brick-and-mortar store, may not bring a claim.55
Under the indirect purchaser rule as applied in federal antitrust law, the
consumers’ recoveries depend on how they purchased the product. Such
inequity, combined with the questionable effect on deterrence and the lack
of compensation to the injured parties, raises serious questions about the
wisdom of Illinois Brick and the indirect purchaser rule.
III. STATE LAW

AND THE

INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE

The indirect purchaser rule was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
the context of a federal antitrust action. However, antitrust enforcement in
the United States occurs under both state and federal law. Indeed, 21 states
had enacted antitrust statutes before the Sherman Act was passed in 1890.56
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated federal antitrust law is designed to
supplement state antitrust law and does not necessarily preempt it.57 Yet
the indirect purchaser rule would seem to be ineffective if plaintiffs could
simply make an end-run around the rule by filing in state court,58 raising the
question of whether Illinois Brick preempts state indirect purchaser suits.
A. California v. ARC America Corp.
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question of federal preemption
of state indirect purchaser rules in ARC America. Alabama, Arizona, California, and Minnesota filed antitrust suits, including federal and state
claims, alleging a nationwide conspiracy to fix cement prices by ARC
54. Ronald W. Davis, Indirect Purchaser Litigation: ARC America’s Chickens Come Home to
Roost on the Illinois Brick Wall, 65 Antitrust L.J. 375, 384–385 (1997).
55. See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735, 741.
56. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 101 n. 4.
57. See e.g. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982); Exxon Corp. v. Gov. of Md.,
437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595 (1976).
58. Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 Tex. L. Rev.
1743, 1764 (1992).
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America and the other defendants.59 The actions were consolidated into
one federal proceeding along with similar actions from other federal courts
around the nation.60 Several of the defendants settled, creating a $32 million settlement fund for the federal district court to distribute.61 The district
court refused to allow the four states to include their state indirect purchaser
claims against the fund, ruling that state indirect purchaser claims were preempted by the federal indirect purchaser rule, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.62
The Supreme Court overturned the ruling, holding Illinois Brick did
not preempt state indirect purchaser suits.63 For a federal law to preempt a
state law: (1) Congress must have expressly preempted the state law; (2)
Congress must have intended to completely occupy the field with federal
law; or (3) the state law must conflict with the federal law.64 In arguing for
preemption, ARC America not only needed to establish that the indirect
purchaser rule fell into one of the three categories for preemption but also
was required to overcome the presumption against preemption in areas “traditionally regulated by the States.”65
ARC America argued state indirect purchaser suits conflicted with federal law because they “pose[d] an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
purposes and objectives of Congress.”66 But the Court noted state indirect
purchaser suits would not interfere with Congress’s goal of avoiding complexity in federal antitrust actions.67 Further, federal policy does not prevent states from imposing liability in addition to federal liability,68 and allowing state claims would not reduce the incentive for direct purchasers to
bring suits under federal law.69 Under ARC America, application of the
indirect purchaser rule in state antitrust suits depends on the law of that
state.70
B. State Approaches
Generally, states take one of three approaches to the indirect purchaser
rule. Some states have adopted legislation, commonly known as an Illinois
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 97–98.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 98–99.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 100.
ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 101.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 101–102.
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Brick repealer, expressly creating indirect purchaser standing under their
state antitrust laws. Other states have left the indirect purchaser question to
be decided by their courts. Among those states, some have interpreted their
antitrust statutes consistently with Illinois Brick, while others have not.
Those states that interpret their antitrust statutes consistently with Illinois Brick tend to rely on harmonization statutes. For example, in a Maryland case, Davidson v. Microsoft Corporation,71 the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals focused on the provision of the Maryland Antitrust Act that
said courts should be “guided by the interpretation given by federal courts
to the various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters.”72
Because the court had no express statement from the legislature establishing
that it should not follow Illinois Brick, it interpreted the Maryland statutes
consistently with the federal case law.73 The court also noted the Maryland
legislature had rejected a general Illinois Brick repealer statute but had
passed one regarding government plaintiffs, further establishing the Maryland legislature did not intend to give non-governmental indirect purchasers
the ability to bring a suit.74
Even when state courts interpret their antitrust statutes consistently
with Illinois Brick, they might allow other claims involving the same acts
by the defendant. For instance, a Florida appellate court found that indirect
purchasers have standing to bring claims under the State’s consumer protection statutes even though the State’s antitrust statutes barred the claims.75
In particular, the court recognized the consumer protection statutes allowed
consumers to bring actions for violations of the consumer protection rules
promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission, including price fixing.76
The court noted that prohibiting indirect purchaser suits under the consumer
protection statutes would be contrary to the legislative policy behind those
statutes.77 At least one article viewed the decision as an adoption of “a
means of avoiding the sometimes harsh effect of Illinois Brick.”78
Other states have used a more direct approach to avoid the harshness
of the indirect purchaser rule and simply found Illinois Brick inapplicable
under state law. The Iowa Supreme Court took such an approach in Comes
v. Microsoft Corporation.79 In that case, the Court held the harmonization
71. Davidson v. Microsoft Corp., 792 A.2d 336 (Md. Spec. App. 2002).
72. Id. at 340 (quoting Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 11–202(a)(2) (2000, 2001 Supp.)).
73. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 342.
74. Id. at 341.
75. Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So.2d 100, 103, 110 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 1996).
76. Id. at 103–104.
77. Id. at 110.
78. William J. Blechman & Scott E. Perwin, Formula for Success: Standing of Indirect Purchasers
under the Florida Deceptive & Unfair Trade Practices Act, 71 Fla. B.J. 81, 81 (Mar. 1997).
79. Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 2002).
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provision in the State’s antitrust statutes required consistent application of
state and federal antitrust law to create a uniform standard of conduct for
businesses, not to create uniformity in who could sue.80 Further, despite the
harmonization provision, the Iowa legislature adopted its antitrust statutes
under the interpretation of federal antitrust statutes before Illinois Brick, so
the indirect purchaser rule was not in effect when the legislature adopted
federal law and was not part of the legislative intent behind the law.81 Finally, the Court said the policies behind Illinois Brick did not apply to Iowa
antitrust actions: the possibility of multiple recoveries was overstated;82 direct purchasers seem unlikely to sue their suppliers;83 and, while litigation
by indirect purchasers may be complicated, such complication should not
“defeat the ends of justice.”84
Other states have more explicitly countered the effect of Illinois Brick
by enacting “repealer” legislation. Two states, Alabama and Mississippi,
had legislation allowing indirect purchaser suits on the books before Illinois
Brick was decided,85 but several other states enacted such legislation after
the decision.86 Illinois Brick repealers vary greatly from state to state,87
perhaps because they can be easily tailored to meet the needs of each
state.88 Although Illinois Brick is usually discussed in terms of indirect
purchasers suing monopolists, some states have worded their repealer statutes to cover monopsony89 as well—an important consideration in agricultural states where a single buyer of an agricultural commodity could largely
control the prices farmers and ranchers receive.90 Similarly, some states
limit their repealers by limiting indirect purchaser status to certain classes,
such as purchasers in certain industries.91 As discussed above, the Maryland legislature rejected a general indirect purchaser statute but enacted one
granting the government such standing when the government purchased indirectly.92 Similarly, in 2005, Maryland passed another limited Illinois
Brick repealer applying only in suits against sellers of food, drugs, cosmet80. Id. at 446.
81. Id. at 447.
82. Id. at 449.
83. Id. at 450.
84. Id. at 450–451.
85. S. Scott Parel, Removing the Illiniois Brick Standing Barrier from the Texas Free Enterprise &
Antitrust Act—A Matter of Choice, 50 SMU L. Rev. 409, 419 n. 59 (1996).
86. Robert H. Lande, New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real
Victims of Antitrust Violations, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 447, 448 (2010).
87. Id. at 449.
88. Id. at 450.
89. A monopsony is a “market situation in which one buyer controls the market.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1098 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed., West 2009).
90. Lande, supra n. 86, at 456.
91. Id. at 459.
92. Davidson, 792 A.2d at 341 (citing Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 11–209(b)(2)(ii) (1982)).
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ics, or commercial feeds.93 Additionally, repealers vary in whether they
allow the alleged monopolist to assert the passing-on defense and what
level of damages they allow.94 Such provisions may represent genuine policy goals but also might represent a political compromise necessary to get
such legislation passed.95
IV.

AN ILLINOIS BRICK REPEALER COULD INCREASE THE NUMBER
ANTITRUST CASES BROUGHT IN MONTANA

OF

Adopting an Illinois Brick repealer would create an additional class of
citizens with standing to bring claims under the MUTPA, which could feasibly increase the number of claims brought. Although Montana law has
been construed by at least one commentator to allow indirect purchaser
claims,96 the MUTPA does not clearly provide standing for indirect purchasers. The lack of a clear indicator of whether the MUTPA allows indirect purchaser standing may chill practitioners from bringing such claims,
especially in light of the prevailing party being entitled to attorney’s fees.97
A. Validity of Indirect Purchaser Suits Is Unclear
under Montana Statutes
Montana’s code includes two primary ways of asserting antitrust
claims: the MCPA and the MUTPA. The MCPA’s prohibition on “unfair
methods of competition”98 helps fulfill the overall purpose of that Act: “to
protect the public from unfair or deceptive practices engaged in by trade or
commerce.”99 The MUTPA prohibits restrictions on trade to protect the
public from monopolies and to encourage competition.100 Each Act has its
relative advantages and disadvantages, but neither provides a clear statement indicating whether or not Montana accepts the U.S. Supreme Court’s
adoption of the indirect purchaser rule in Illinois Brick.
The MCPA does not definitively indicate whether indirect purchasers
could bring an action under the Act. The MCPA creates a private cause of
action for “consumers” injured by violations of the Act,101 including those
93. Lande, supra n. 86, at 459–460 (citing Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 21–1114 (Lexis Supp.
2008)).
94. Id. at 456–459, 476–477.
95. Id. at 460.
96. Daniel R. Karon, “Your Honor, Tear Down That Illinois Brick Wall!”––The National Movement toward Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Standing & Consumer Justice, 30 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1351,
1384–1386 (2004).
97. Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–222(4).
98. Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–103.
99. Plath v. Schonrock, 64 P.3d 984, 990 (Mont. 2003).
100. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 30–14–201, 205.
101. Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–133(1).
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harmed by unfair methods of competition.102 To qualify as a consumer a
person must purchase or lease goods or services for personal, family, or
household purposes,103 but no language addresses whether consumers may
bring suits as indirect purchasers. The MCPA also includes a harmonization provision that requires courts to give “due consideration and weight” to
the corresponding statute in the Federal Trade Commission Act but does not
make the consideration of that Act binding.104 Because federal law does
not bind Montana courts in this area, the indirect purchaser rule does not
necessarily apply. Because the definition of consumer does not speak to
whether the purchase or lease could be indirect, that uncertainty could create a chilling effect on the antitrust cases that might be brought under the
MCPA.
The structure of the MCPA may further chill the number of antitrust
cases brought under it. The Act creates a general prohibition on unfair
methods of competition but does not include any more specific language
indicating per se violations.105 The lack of more clearly defined statutory
violations could create uncertainty for potential plaintiffs. While the
MCPA includes a harmonization provision,106 federal case law is not binding to create such clearly-defined per se violations. Additionally, a consumer who successfully litigates a case under the MCPA may only receive
the greater of actual damages or $500 and could receive treble damages in
the court’s discretion.107 As the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in
Hanover, indirect purchaser plaintiffs may each have a relatively small recovery,108 which means their incentive to bring claims would likely be low.
Further, the MCPA does not allow private class actions,109 which would
allow consumers to aggregate low value claims into a single suit. Even
though the Montana Supreme Court has adopted a standard allowing attorney’s fees against an MCPA plaintiff only if the action was found frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation,110 the language of the MCPA allows
attorney’s fees at judicial discretion,111 and some practitioners may be unaware of that plaintiff-friendly rule. Each of these factors might contribute
to why this author could locate no antitrust decisions filed under the MCPA.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–102(1).
Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–104(1).
Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–103.
Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–104.
Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–133(1).
Hanover Shoe, Inc., 392 U.S. at 494.
Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–133(1).
Tripp v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 112 P.3d 1018, 1026 (Mont. 2005).
Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–133(3).
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The MUTPA also fails to address whether the indirect purchaser rule
applies. Under the MUTPA, “[a] person who is or will be injured” may sue
those illegally restraining trade,112 but the MUTPA does not explicitly state
whether the injured person can be an indirect purchaser. The MUTPA does
not have a harmonization provision, but the Montana Supreme Court has
construed MUTPA provisions that are similar to the Sherman Act consistently with federal interpretations of the Sherman Act.113 Yet nothing in the
Act definitively establishes whether the indirect purchaser rule applies
under the MUTPA.
Despite the ambiguity regarding whether the indirect purchaser rule
applies under the Act, the MUTPA includes other advantages that increase
the likelihood of antitrust suits being brought under the Act. The MUTPA
prohibits several per se restraints of trade like price-fixing, bid-rigging, and
selling at less than cost,114 which decrease a potential plaintiff’s uncertainty
about what conduct is prohibited by the Act. It also allows plaintiffs to
recover the greater of mandatory treble damages or $1000 plus another
$500 for each day the defendant violated the Act115—penalties which are
significantly higher than under the MCPA and might create an incentive for
potential plaintiffs to bring suits. Additionally, eligible plaintiffs can bring
class action claims under the MUTPA because, unlike the MCPA, the
MUTPA does not include a provision prohibiting such actions. And while
the MUTPA allows the prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees,116 the
greater certainty associated with per se rules and the greater possible recovery would likely outweigh the risks of that provision for potential plaintiffs.
Yet even under the MUTPA, few antitrust decisions have been issued.
Although the MUTPA has higher mandatory penalties and the potential for
class actions, only six Montana Supreme Court cases and eleven Montana
District Court cases have discussed the merits of cases under the Act. The
uncertainty associated with the ambiguity of indirect purchaser standing
under the Act, combined with the mandatory attorney’s fees statute, likely
has a chilling effect on the number of suits brought under the MUTPA.
Ultimately, the lack of a definite statutory provision allowing indirect purchaser suits in both the MCPA and the MUTPA may increase the risk for
antitrust plaintiffs, thereby reducing the number of suits they will bring.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–222.
Smith v. Video Lottery Consultants, Inc., 858 P.2d 11, 13 (Mont. 1993).
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 30–14–205, 209.
Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–222(2).
Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–222(4).
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B. Case Law Does Not Clarify Indirect Purchaser Status in Montana
The Montana Supreme Court has never issued an opinion on whether
the indirect purchaser doctrine applies in Montana, and only one state district court case has ever decided the issue. In Olson v. Microsoft Corporation,117 the Montana First Judicial District Court held a class action antitrust
suit under the MUTPA could move forward because the indirect purchaser
rule does not apply under Montana law.118 Although the court recognized
that Montana case law generally supports interpreting the MUTPA with
deference to the jurisprudence under the Sherman Act,119 it also noted that
the Montana constitution has a strong policy regarding open courts.120 In
particular, Article II, section 16 of the Montana Constitution states: “Courts
of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for
every injury of person, property, or character.” The Olson court held that
constitutional provision, as well as the lack of language limiting the injured
persons who can sue under the MUTPA to direct purchasers, established the
indirect purchaser rule did not apply under Montana law.121
However, the Olson decision does not provide a definitive answer on
the question. Olson, as a trial court decision, does not bind other trial courts
in Montana or the Montana Supreme Court. Also, the decision does not
accord much weight to prior Montana Supreme Court cases holding the
MUTPA should be interpreted with deference to Sherman Act jurisprudence.
Finally, the reliance on Montana’s constitutional provision providing
for open courts neglects to consider the effect of Meech v. Hillhaven West,
Inc.122 on that constitutional right. In Meech, the plaintiff challenged the
constitutionality of the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act (“WDEA”) when the defendant moved to dismiss his common law
claims as preempted under the WDEA.123 The plaintiff argued that by preempting his common law claims, the WDEA violated “his fundamental
right to full legal redress.”124 The Meech Court made clear that the open
courts clause was aimed at “equal administration of justice” by the courts125
and not at creating a fundamental right to a particular cause of action.126
Although in dicta, the Court was particularly clear that the judiciary could
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Olson v. Microsoft Corp., 2001 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 2710 (Mont. 1st. Dist. Feb. 15, 2001).
Id. at **10–11.
Id. at **9–10 (citing Smith, 858 P.2d at 13).
Id. at *11 (citing Mont. Const. art. II, § 16).
Id.
Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 493.
Id. at 497–498.
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also limit common law causes of action through its decisions, like when it
abolished the inter-spousal tort immunity defense.127 An extension of that
reasoning would allow Montana courts to similarly limit statutory causes of
action when the statute was particularly unclear or was silent and needed
interpretation. For these reasons, the Olson case does not make the applicability of the indirect purchaser rule in Montana particularly clear.
C. Appropriate Legislation Would Reduce Uncertainty about the
Applicability of the Indirect Purchaser Rule in Montana
An Illinois Brick repealer would clarify the status of the indirect purchaser rule in the State. By legislatively rejecting the indirect purchaser
rule in Montana, such a repealer would reduce the uncertainty currently
inherent in bringing an indirect purchaser antitrust action, thus reducing the
risk those plaintiffs face in bringing such an action. A repealer would also
further the MUTPA’s statutory purpose of preventing monopolies and safeguarding competition128 by broadening the class of plaintiffs allowed to
bring claims under the MUTPA.
An Illinois Brick repealer would be most effective when applied to the
MUTPA. The MUTPA already provides greater statutory penalties than the
MCPA, including mandatory, rather than discretionary, treble damages.129
The MUTPA does not prohibit class action suits; class action suits amplify
the incentive for indirect purchasers to bring a claim. The MUTPA,
through more definite rules, provides a clearer picture of what conduct qualifies as anticompetitive conduct than the MCPA does, further reducing the
plaintiff’s risk in bringing a suit. Finally, the MCPA cause of action allows
consumers to bring suits; some states have interpreted the definition of consumer to include indirect purchasers.130 Ultimately, a repealer explicitly
allowing indirect purchaser suits may be less necessary and effective under
the MCPA than the MUTPA.
A repealer in Montana should not only explicitly allow indirect purchaser suits but also explain both that the passing-on defense is allowed and
how damages will be apportioned between direct and indirect purchasers.
These provisions should be tailored to best achieve the dual goals of deterrence and compensation without increasing unnecessary litigation costs.131
Because of its relatively small economy, Montana must also consider
whether overly severe rules might drive business out of the State. Allowing
the passing-on defense would prevent multiple recoveries, which might
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 495.
Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–201.
Compare Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–133(1) with § 30–14–222(2).
See e.g. Mack, 673 So.2d at 108.
Lande, supra n. 86, at 495.
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have the unwanted result of decreasing the deterrence effect of allowing
indirect purchaser suits, but would also seem more fair to antitrust defendants.
Although Montana could enact statutory rules conclusively determining the apportionment of recoveries between direct and indirect purchasers
and thus reduce the complexity and expense of such litigation, creating a
rebuttable apportionment presumption would better serve the goal of compensating antitrust plaintiffs for their injuries.132 Further, adopting a rebuttable presumption that antitrust damages accrue to the final consumer unless proven otherwise would generally grant the damages to the parties most
likely to be injured: the consumers.133 Although such a provision may create a disincentive for direct purchasers to bring claims,134 direct purchasers
already have a disincentive to sue their suppliers. And in cases where the
injury to direct purchasers is egregious enough to overcome those disincentives, a direct purchaser could still rebut the presumption. An Illinois Brick
repealer in Montana should allow indirect purchaser suits and the passingon defense and should create a rebuttable presumption that damages will
accrue to the final consumer.
Additionally, while amending the MUTPA to include an Illinois Brick
repealer, the Montana Legislature should also consider amending the Act’s
attorney’s fees provisions. Currently, the plain language of the statute requires attorney’s fees be awarded to the prevailing party,135 which increases
the risk inherent in private enforcement actions. In contrast, the Clayton
Act authorizes an injured antitrust plaintiff to recover “the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”136 Federal courts have held the attorney’s fee award is to protect a successful plaintiff’s treble damages from
being unduly diminished by attorney’s fees.137 And under the Clayton Act,
attorney’s fees are not allowed for a successful defense of such an action.138
Ultimately, the Clayton Act attorney’s fees provision furthers the punitive
nature of the treble damages policy against antitrust violators and provides
an incentive for private enforcement of the law.139 Montana could reduce
132. Id. at 478–483.
133. Id. at 478.
134. Id.
135. Mont. Code Ann. § 30–14–222(4).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
137. Perkins v. Stand. Oil Co. of Cal., 474 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing Farmington Dowel
Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 88 (1st Cir. 1969)), supplemented, 487 F.2d 672 (9th Cir.
1973).
138. Gillam v. A. Shyman, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 534, 535 (D. Alaska 1962); Byram Concretanks, Inc. v.
Warren Concrete Prods. Co. of N.J., 374 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1967).
139. Redefining the “Cost of Suit” under Section Four of the Clayton Act, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1905,
1920, 1922 (1984).
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the risk to antitrust plaintiffs under the MUTPA by amending the Act to
only allow attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs.
Each of these revisions to the MUTPA would be relatively easy to
effect in amending the statute. First, to allow indirect purchaser suits, Montana Code Annotated § 30–14–222(a) should be amended to read “a person
who dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant and who is or will be
injured or the department may bring an action,” instead of “a person who is
or will be injured or the department may bring an action” as it currently
reads. Using the “dealt with” language would allow indirect claims to be
brought against both monopolists and monopsonists. Another subsection
should be added to § 30–14–222 to address the passing-on defense and to
create a rebuttable presumption regarding damages apportionment. For example:
A defendant may prove as a partial or complete defense to damages that those
damages were accrued by other parties in the supply chain, as long as those
other parties have been joined in the suit. All damages incurred from a violation of this part will be presumed to have been passed on to the ultimate
purchaser or seller, but any party, plaintiff or defendant, may rebut that presumption with a preponderance of the evidence.

Finally, the repealer should include an amendment to the attorney’s fees
provision in § 30–14–222(4), replacing the words “the prevailing party”
with “a prevailing plaintiff,” so the subsection reads: “In an action brought
by a party other than the department, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to
attorney’s fees and costs.” These amendments would address the primary
concerns regarding indirect purchaser suits in Montana.
V. CONCLUSION
One approach Montana could take to increase private antitrust enforcement would be to enact an Illinois Brick repealer rejecting the indirect purchaser rule. Under ARC America, such a rule is not preempted by federal
law. A repealer would allow Montana to counteract some of the negative
effects of Illinois Brick, including the denial of compensation to injured
indirect purchasers and the deferral of private enforcement to direct purchasers who may have less incentive to sue their suppliers. The MUTPA is
well suited for such a repealer because it allows class actions and has
clearly defined many anticompetitive behaviors as unlawful. Finally, by
reducing the uncertainty about whether indirect purchasers can sue under
the MUTPA, an Illinois Brick repealer would decrease the plaintiff’s risk in
bringing an antitrust action and increase private antitrust enforcement in
Montana.
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